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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
nition of the Dillon court that Congress could properly enact
the proposals that became the present Criminal Justice Act -
including the fee schedulesso - indicates the court's own inse-
curity about the applicability of the fifth amendment to attor-
ney's services.
Aside from the constitutional infirmities of the Dillon decision,
the Criminal Justice Act appears to be the better solution for
the admitted problem on practical grounds. The bar does not
view the statutory rates as unreasonables' and since the rates
are lower than the market rate2 less strain would be imposed
on the treasury. Furthermore, the fixed statutory rates make
the Criminal Justice Act much easier to administer than the
eminent domain approach, which requires an ad hoc determina-
tion of the value of each attorney's services.
Administrative Law-Contempt: Federal Agent
Convicted of Contempt for Following Agency
Head's Instructions Not To Testify
Plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court to enjoin
the agent in charge of the Chicago office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation' from keeping the plaintiff under a harassing sur-
veillance. During a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the plaintiff's attorney called the agent as an adverse
30. Ibid. In criticizing the pending bill the court noted only that it did
not appear to cover post-conviction and collateral proceedings such as in
Dillon. The act could be so construed if the representation from time of
initial appearance through appeal provided by the act is viewed as a time
span applying only to the trial proper. In view of the act's purpose to provide
paid counsel whenever needed, it would seem more appropriate to read it as
applying to representation through appeal in the case of any proceeding. See
Letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to The President, March 6,
1963, in 13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3048, 3049 (1964) emphasizing that
counsel is guaranteed "at every stage of the proceedings, commencing with
the initial appearance . . . ." However, the Judicial Conference takes the posi-
tion that the act does not cover habeas corpus or § 2255 proceedings. JUrcIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNTED STATES, REPORT ON THE CRmnxAL JUSTICE ACT
11 (1965), in 85 Sup. Ct. No. 10.
31. See AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N STANDiNG Comm. ON LEGAL Am AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND THE NAT L LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER Ass'N,
GuiDELINES FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 11 (1964) (model legislation).
32. Dillon's counsel was awarded $35 per hour. 230 F. Supp. at 494.
1. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, was also
named in the complaint as a defendant, Appendix for Appellant, p. 1, Giancana
v. Johnson, 385 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964), but the complaint against him was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. p. 284.
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witness. The agent asserted that a Justice Department regulation,
which forbade production or disclosure of documents or informa-
tion in the Department's files without the permission of the Attor-
ney General, barred him from answering certain questions. The
court ordered him to answer the questions and upon his refusal fined
him 500 dollars for criminal contempt. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the contempt order in a two-to-one decision,
holding that the regulation did not apply to the questions asked
of the agent about exhibits which were never in the files of the
Justice Department and about his own activities. Gianeana v.
Johnson, 335 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964).'
The Justice Department regulation centralizes in the Attorney
General the determination of whether "material or information
2. The questions pertained to the following: (1) whether he had received
a telegram, a copy of which plaintiff's attorney displayed as he asked the
question; (2) whether he had placed a telephone call to plaintiff's attorney
on a certain date; (3) whether he had said during the telephone conversation
that the surveillance was not going to be removed; (4) whether he was in the
courtroom when certain films were shown; and (5) whether he had recognized
any FBI agents under his supervision in films plaintiff had exhibited in court.
He was allowed to change his answer to (4) above to an affirmative response
before sentencing.
The two judge majority differed on whether to affirm the lower court's
ruling in all respects. The principal opinion held the defendant properly re-
fused to answer whether he had received a telegram from the plaintiff's
attorney as an affirmative answer would have established that it was in the
files of the department. 885 F.2d at 875. The concurring opinion held he was
not barred from answering that question since an answer did not require
production of documents or information from the files and concerned a matter
of which he had personal knowledge. Id. at 876.
3. In the civil suit in which the contempt issue arose, the plaintiff sought
an injunction to restrain the agent and other agents under his supervision
from keeping plaintiff under a harassing surveillance. The plaintiff claimed
his rights under the fourth and fifth amendments were being violated. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction. This judgment was vacated
and the case remanded to the district court in Giancana v. Johnson, 835 FRed
366 (7th Cir. 1964), on the grounds that the claim of "federal question"
jurisdiction was not supported by an allegation of an amount in controversy
exceeding $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), McNutt v. General Motors
Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
4. PART 16 [ORDER 260-69]-PRODUCTION OR DISCLOSURE
OF MATERIAL OR INFORMATION, 28 C.F.R. J§ 16.1, .2 (1964) (Judicial
Administration-Department of Justice), provides:
§ 16.1 Response to Subpoena or Order for Production or Disclosure.
Whenever a United States Attorney or any other officer or employee
of the Department of Justice is served with a subpoena or order for
-the production or disclosure of material or information contained in
the files of the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney, or
such other attorney as may be designated, shall appear with the person
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contained in the files of the Department of Justice . . ." will be
furnished in response to a court order for the production thereof.
If the Attorney General decides that nondisclosure is in the public
interest, he may assert that the information is privileged." In
upon whom the demand is made and inform the court or other issuing
authority that such person is not authorized to produce or disclose the
material or information sought. Time shall be requested within which to
refer the subpoena or order to the Attorney General, and the United
States Attorney, or other attorney, designated, shall refer the court to
the regulations in this part. Advice as to such subpoena or order shall
be given immediately to the Attorney General without awaiting court
appearance.
& 16.2 Action to be Taken on Adverse Ruling by the Court.
In the event the court declines to defer a ruling until instructions
from the Attorney General have been received or in the event the
court rules adversely on a claim of privilege asserted under instructions
of the Attorney General, the person upon whom such demand is made
shall, pursuant to the regulations in this part, respectfully decline to
produce the material or information sought (United States ex rel.
Touhy v. Ragen, 840 U.S. 462).
5. The main justification for such regulations is that they protect the pub-
lic interest in effective law enforcement by restricting access to information
in the possession of the Government which, if disclosed, could hinder the
work of the Government's law enforcement agencies. See United States ex
rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 468 (1951); Carrow, Governmental Non-
disclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 168 (1958); Sanford,
Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control
of Executive Departments, 3 VAn. L. REV. 73, 80 (1949); Timbers & Cohen,
Demands of Litigants for Government Information, 18 U. Pir. L. REv. 687
(1957). Such regulations may also make available information which, if the
decision whether to disclose or not were left to a subordinate, would not be
disclosed.
The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of regulations similar to
the one construed in Giancana. See United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen,
supra; Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900). In those two cases subordi-
nates of the Justice Department and the Treasury Department, respectively,
were released from commitments by lower courts for contempt.
6. Courts recognize a privilege for some information in the possession of
the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953);
Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 1962); Appeal of the SEC,
226 F.2d 501, 520 (6th Cir. 1958). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EvImcE § 2878
(MoNaughton rev. 1961); Ashbill & Snell, Scope of Discovery Against the
United States, 7 VAND. L. Rzv. 582 (1954); Carrow, Governmental Nondis-
closure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1958); Hardin, Execu-
tive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Sanford, Evi-
dentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of
Executive Departments, 3 VAN. L. REv. 73 (1949).
Wigmore states that the limits of this privilege are unknown but that the
courts generally use as a guideline, UNwIORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 34, which
states:
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Giancana the question arose as to whether certain information
gained by a subordinate while acting in an official capacity fell
within the province of the regulation. Evidently the Attorney
General had interpreted the regulation as applying to such infor-
mation, as well as to documentary information actually within
the Department's files, and instructed agent Johnson not to pro-
duce any of the requested documents or give any of the required
testimony.7 Johnson contended that under the regulation only
the Attorney General could decide whether to disclose the infor-
mation necessary to answer the questions, and that unless he had
decided to do so, the agent, even when faced with a court order,
could not answer." The Giancans court disagreed with this
interpretation.
When an administrative regulation is before a court, the rules
Official Information
(1) As used in this rule, "official information" means information not
open or heretofore officially disclosed to the public relating to internal
affairs of this State or of the United States acquired by a public official
of this State or of the United States in the course of his duty, or trans-
mitted from one such official to another in the course of his duty.
(2) A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose a matter on the
ground that it is official information, and evidence of the matter is
inadmissible if the judge finds that the matter is official information,
and (a) disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the United
States or a statute of this State, or (b) disclosure of the information in
the action will be harmful to the interests of the government of which
the witness is an officer in a governmental capacity.
The Supreme Court has agreed with this rule that it is for the court
rather than the person or agency concerned to decide whether -the information
is actually to be protected by a privilege. See United States v. Reynolds,
supra at 9-10: "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdi-
cated to the caprice of executive officers."
In Giancana the Attorney General did not specifically assert the privilege,
see note 7 infra, but simply instructed Johnson not to comply with the court
order pursuant to the regulation. In any event, the court never reached the
question of whether the information requested in Giancana would 'have been
privileged had it fallen within the coverage of the regulation, since the regula-
tion was found inapplicable.
7. The defendant was ordered not to answer the questions 'by the Attorney
General in a telegram addressed to the United States Attorney, Chicago,
which stated:
Your attention is directed to Department Order No. 260-62. In con-
nection with the matter under which Special Agent Marlin Johnson is
now under subpoena, he is instructed to abide by Order No. 260-62.
Johnson is instructed not to produce any of the documents called for
nor to give any testimony in this matter.
Appendix for Appellant, p. 222.
8. Brief & Supplemental Appendix for Appellant, pp. 28-29, Giancana
v. Johnson, 835 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964).
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of construction are the same as for a statute administered by an
agency.9 It is the court rather than the agency which must deter-
mine its true construction or interpretation. 0 However, the court
will give great weight to the interpretation by the agency which
promulgated it" unless such interpretation allows the agency to
exceed the authority granted by Congress,'2 and when that inter-
pretation is not clearly erroneous or contrary to the plain mean-
ing of the regulation, it is binding on the court.'3 The difficulty
with this rule of construction is that there are differences of opin-
ion over what is the plain meaning of words."
The issue before the court in Giancana was whether the ques-
tions asked of the defendant would require disclosure of "material
or information contained in the files of the Department of Jus-
tice."" The majority evidently felt that this phrase excluded the
Attorney General's interpretation," but disagreed on how to
interpret it themselves. One judge thought it justified the agent's
refusal to answer the question whether he had received a certain
telegram from the plaintiffs attorney, because an affirmative an-
swer would have "established thereby that [the telegram] ... was
in the files of the Department of Justice."'7 The other disagreed
9. See Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 85 CAMiF. L. Rav. 509
(1947).
10. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 1S (1947); M. Kraus &
Bros. v. United States, 827 U.S. 614, 621-25 (1946).
11. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Childress Cotton Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 937,
940 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Froeber-Norfleet v. Southern Ry., 9 F. Supp. 409, 411
(N.D. Ga. 1934); of. Southern Goods Corp. v. Bowles, 158 F.2d 587, 590 (4th
Cir. 1946) (respectful consideration).
12. There is no doubt that the Attorney General could have promulgated
a regulation which specifically prohibited disclosure of the information re-
quested from the agent in Giancana. The statutory authority for these regula-
tions is very broad. See Rav. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22
(1958). Since the Attorney General obviously intended to prevent Johnson
from testifying, his decision not to broaden the scope of the regulation by
amendment supports the conclusion that the regulation as written would
reasonaibly bear the interpretation he gave it.
18. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); FCC
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 184, 148 n.6 (1940); Glen Alden Coal
Co. v. NLRB, 141 F.2d 47, 52 (8d Cir. 1944).
14. Newman, supra note 9, at 525.
15. See the full text of the regulation, supra note 4.
16. "[Als to (questions 2, 3 & 5, supra note 2], .. . no application of Order
260-62 was involved." 385 F.2d at 875.
17. Ibid. The decision that the regulation precluded the agent from testi-
fying as to what was contained in the files, prevented him from proving that
the answer to any given question asked him was in the files. Perhaps this
should have obligated the court to accept the agent's claim that the other
information was in the files.
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because "the question concerned a matter of which he had per-
sonal knowledge."'s Such disagreement indicates that the regula-
tion was not unambiguous, and in this situation "the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation ... ."1
The Supreme Court has said that "the purpose in view is for
consideration when the true meaning of a statute or rule is
sought."20 If the administrative interpretation is inconsistent
with that purpose, then, of course, it is not binding on the court 2
The purpose of the regulation in question was to centralize con-
trol over information in the possession of the department. The
Attorney General's order not to testify was not inconsistent with
that purpose."2
Even if the court was justified in substituting its interpretation
of the regulation for that of the Attorney General, there was no
justification for allowing the contempt order to stand. The plain-
tiff did not need the defendant's testimony in order to prove his
case for a preliminary injunction?3 In fact, his failure to testify
and to deny the facts alleged by the plaintiff probably helped
the plaintiff's case more than his answers to the questions would
have helped it?4 In addition, the Supreme Court has decided in
United States ex rel. Touhy v. RageP5 that subordinates who
are acting in conformance with lawful regulations in refusing to
obey a court order for the production of information in the pos-
18. Id. at 376. He evidently gave no weight to the phrase: "disclosure of
... information contained in the fdes . . . ."
19. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
90. Hines v. Stein, 298 U.S. 94, 98 (1936).
21. Cf. Walling v. Brooklyn Braid Co., 152 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir. 1945),
where the court said that the respect to be accorded an agency interpretation
depended on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, [and] the validity
of its reasoning . . .
92. In Ex parte Sackett, 74 Red 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1935), the court found
that documents physically in the possession of an FBI agent were, in the
eyes of the law, in the possession of the Attorney General.
In In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446 (D. Ark. 1903), the court looked at the
reason behind a Treasury Department regulation forbidding only the produc-
tion of documents and construed it to preclude disclosure of information
received by an officer in his official capacity also.
28. See the findings of fact enumerated by the dissenting judge in the
companion case, Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.d 366, 370 n.1 (7th Cir. 1964).
24. The trial judge stated in his findings of fact "that the [agent] ...
has not shown to the court any reason or justification for the surveillance and
observation of the plaintiff as shown by the evidence." Appendix for Appel-
lant, p. 67.
25. 340 U.S. 469 (1951).
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session of the Government cannot be convicted of contempt.
In Giancana, the agent was acting in conformance with his su-
perior's interpretation of a lawful regulation. Thus the imposition
of contempt sanctions would seem to be contrary to the policy
of Touhy to immunize subordinates from judicial punishment for
relying on a seemingly legitimate interpretation of a departmental
regulation?"6
It is evident that the court was convinced that the regulation
had been invoked to avoid disclosure of FBI misconduct violating
the plaintiff's legal rights27 This did not justify punishment of
the subordinate who may have had nothing to do with the deci-
sion to invoke it, however. He was faced with a choice between
obeying his superior and obeying the court?" In such circum-
stances it is hard to understand how a court can find the requisites
of willfulness 9 or misbehaviorso necessary for a finding of criminal
contempt
A better solution would have been for the court to declare
that since plaintiff secured the relief he sought, there was no
public interest32 to be served by the imposition of contempt sanc-
26. See also Appeal of SEC, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1958), where the court
reprimanded the district court judge for immediately commiting for contempt
an SEC employee who relied on SEC regulations and orders from his superiors
in refusing to obey the judge's orders to produce documents.
27. "Although order No. 260-62 is a legal exercise of executive authority
to protect the files of the department, it should not be used, as attempted
here, to escape responsibility for conduct that is allegedly violative of legal
rights." 335 F.2d at 376 (concurring opinion).
28. If he had obeyed the court he could have been charged with insubor-
dination. Petition for Rehearing on Behalf of Appellant p. 5, Giancana v.
Johnson, 835 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1964).
29. See Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 598-600 (1898); United
States v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168, 179-78 (7th Cir. 1947).
80. See Offutt v. United States, 232 F~2d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
31.
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and
none other, as -
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
32. The public interest which conflicts with the policy behind restricting
access to information in possession of the Government is the public interest
in making all relevant evidence available in order to properly decide a case
before a court. Carrow, supra note 6; Sanford, supra note 6.
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tions; plaintiff could secure the information he sought, prior to a
final hearing on making the injunction permanent, through dis-
covery proceedings. Then, if the agent failed to permit discovery,
appropriate sanctions, other than contempt," could be imposed
on him. One of these sanctions - a default judgment - would
place the consequences of failure to disclose on the real party at
fault, the Government, not a mere subordinate.
Criminal Law-Constitutional Law: Gouled Rule and
Authorization by Spouse of Search and Seizure in
Absence of Defendant or Suspect
Defendant appealed from a second degree murder conviction
contending that a bullet admitted into evidence at his trial was
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment Defendant's wife
allowed the police to recover the bullet from a ceiling into which
defendant had discharged his gun one year before the crime in
question was committed. The murder weapon, which was never
found, was linked to the defendant by proving that the bullets
recovered from the ceiling and the victim were fired from the
same gun. Had defendant's wife not permitted the officers to
retrieve the bullet, it probably could not have been obtained by
a search warrant.? The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendants con-
viction and held that the wife, being in possession and control of
the premises, could authorize a reasonable search for, and re-
covery of, the bullet, since it was not defendant's personal effect,
and in any case he had abandoned it. Roberts v. United States,
832 F.d 892 (8th Cir. 1964).s
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37. These sanctions include, besides contempt,
orders to: (1) take any fact as established for the purposes of the action;
(2) refuse to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses; (3) strike out pleadings, dismiss the action, or render a
judgment by default against the disobedient party.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides, "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
2. FED. R. Cam. P. 41(b) only allows a search for stolen or embezzled
property, instruments of a crime, and property used to aid a foreign govern-
ment.
3. Of. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240 (1960); United States v.
Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963). The
Roberts court did not discuss the question of how one may abandon property
in his own home. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the Court
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